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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the way in which society in general and economists in particular deal 
with fundamental uncertainty. It is argued that uncertainty is interdependent with the 
evolution of institutions and behavior, including that designed to help society cope with 
uncertainty. While some mainstream theory does address uncertainty, it employs a much 
narrower concept than fundamental uncertainty. But generally, in spite of the evident 
increase in fundamental uncertainty during the crisis, most mainstream theory ignores it. 
While ignoring uncertainty can at times be a successful coping mechanism, it is argued 
that, as a blanket coping mechanism, ignoring uncertainty seriously limits the realism of 
theory and therefore also practice and policy. It is concluded that economists should 
embrace uncertainty by tailoring methodologies and theories to address it. This would 
provide a more fruitful basis for policy aimed at reducing uncertainty in the economy and 
also reducing our own uncertainty. 
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Introduction 
The crisis saw a marked increase in uncertainty in economic life, but much of economic 
theory continues to preclude it. This is in stark contrast to the centrality of uncertainty in 
Keynes’s thinking and its relevance to the crisis, as explained by Skidelsky (2009, 2011). 
While there has been a revival of interest in Keynesian fiscal solutions to the crisis, little 
attention is paid to the way in which Keynesian uncertainty theory offers an explanation 
for the crisis and thus guidance as to prevention, or at least mitigation, of future crises. 
Some of the resistance to renewing attention to Keynes’s theory of uncertainty is 
reasoned, as in Stiglitz’s (2010) argument that other factors provide better explanations. 
But generally it is left implicit. The purpose of this paper is to use Keynes’s theory of 
uncertainty to explore, not only how uncertainty and perception of uncertainty evolve in 
society in general, but also how they evolve among economists themselves. 
Much of the standard mainstream economics and finance literature ignores 
uncertainty by conflating it with quantifiable risk. Even though it may be accepted that 
risk cannot be quantified in general in objective terms, nevertheless it is argued, 
according to the Subjective Expected Utility model, that we have the capacity to make 
subjective probability estimates, so that unquantifiable risk is no longer relevant. The 
ambiguity and new behavioural economics literatures have attempted to take uncertainty 
more seriously (in the Knightian tradition) as unquantifiable risk. These analyses have 
pointed to substantive effects of uncertainty and uncertainty aversion, particularly on 
financial markets. It is explored here how limited these Knightian treatments of 
uncertainty are compared with Keynesian ‘fundamental’ uncertainty in terms of 
explaining the role played by uncertainty in the emergence of the crisis. A critical 
 2 
difference is the endogenous nature of Keynesian uncertainty, such that it evolves with 
the structural and behavioural changes designed to mitigate uncertainty; we explore these 
mechanisms and how far they have been successful. Particular emphasis is placed on the 
degree to which uncertainty is acknowledged in the economy and among economists 
(building on Dow 1995). The paper concludes with a discussion of uncertainty, in an 
open-system framework, as something other than being simply a source of distortion. The 
discussion encompasses both uncertainty in the economy and uncertainty among 
economists. 
  
The Source, Nature and Consequences of Uncertainty  
Fundamental uncertainty with respect to beliefs, as explored by Keynes (1921), arises 
from the openness (organicness) of the economic system whereby the future is not even 
in principle knowable. The ultimate source of uncertainty is therefore the nature of the 
subject matter, such that uncertainty is aleatory.1 Conventions and institutions evolve and 
behaviour may be creative, such that the units of analysis and their interrelations are not 
predetermined and the structure within which these interrelations occur is itself not 
predetermined. In Lawson’s (1997) words, there is neither intrinsic nor extrinsic closure.2 
Keynes (1921) argued that an absence of quantifiable probabilities was therefore the 
general case. Nevertheless there was scope for ordinal probabilities and even postulating 
a reasonable cardinal range for probabilities. As Keynes (1921: 176) put it: ‘Many 
probabilities, which are incapable of numerical measurement, can be placed nevertheless 
between numerical limits. And by taking particular non-numerical probabilities as 
standards a great number of comparisons or approximate measurements become 
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possible.’ That these are not calculations based as if on probability distributions is 
evidenced by the fact that insurance brokers can quote such a wide range of prices even 
on fairly conventional risks (Feduzi, Runde and Zappia 2012). Rather than a binary 
divide between risk and uncertainty whereby uncertainty amounts to ignorance, Keynes’s 
argument implies that judgement about risk is possible (in some degree) when seeking a 
basis for action. Keynes’s policy prescriptions were then addressed to reducing 
uncertainty, not just when it is most evident in a crisis, but in the longer-run. He proposed 
altering the economic environment, not only with stabilisation policy but also with 
institutional change which would reduce uncertainty (Keynes 1926). This followed from 
his argument that the conditions for uncertainty are always present, not just when 
uncertainty is most evident. 
It is at times of crisis that attention is drawn more widely to uncertainty, and 
indeed uncertainty may vary in intensity over time. At times of crisis the basis for 
judgement may be so weak that there is an unwillingness to set prices altogether (or as 
Runde, 1995, puts it, an unwillingness to place bets in the standard subjectivist Bayesian 
framework). Within a given structure, uncertainty varies with the degree of confidence in 
expectations which in turn varies with the weight of relevant evidence. But the 
conceptualisation of weight itself may vary, for example as new evidence reveals new 
realms of ignorance (Runde 1990). More generally, what is regarded as relevant evidence 
and how it impacts on expectations depends on the prevailing understanding of economic 
processes, but these are open to change, not only in the evidence but also in willingness 
to admit evidence and to admit to uncertainty (Dow 1995). Fundamental uncertainty in 
Keynes’s sense is an objective outcome of logical relations between theory and evidence, 
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but is subjective in that these logical relations hold differently from different 
perspectives, including the attitude taken to uncertainty. Differing degrees of willingness 
to admit more or less limited forms of uncertainty are represented not only in the 
economy but also among economists themselves. 
Mainstream economic and finance theory is generally characterised as not 
admitting fundamental uncertainty at all; where the term ‘uncertainty’ is used the actual 
meaning is generally quantifiable risk. This accords with a closed-system approach to 
theorising, whereby variables are classified as endogenous or exogenous; endogenous 
variables interact in a predetermined way within a given structure, while exogenous 
variables are known to be random. This theoretical system is based on a closed-system 
ontology in the sense that structure, changes in structure and interrelations within the 
structure are all knowable within quantifiable probability distributions (see Lawson 
1997). Any disturbances take the form of shocks to this system, where the shocks are 
known to be stochastic.  
But uncertainty is increasingly being considered as a source of disturbance. For 
example it has been identified as following on from shocks and can therefore be analysed 
itself as a shock (see e.g. Bloom 2009). The microeconomic underpinnings of such an 
approach have been developed in two literatures which take on board the possibility that 
conditions do not allow probability to be quantified: the new behavioural economics and 
the ambiguity approach to decision theory. Rather than quantifiable risk, uncertainty for 
these approaches is presented in the Knightian (1921) sense of unquantifiable risk, i.e. an 
absence of quantifiable probabilities, and therefore ignorance. Behavioural economics 
shifts the focus from rational choice, which requires quantifiable probability-based 
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beliefs, to psychology as the basis for beliefs (see e.g. Barbaris and Thalrers’ 2003, 
review). Experimental evidence has supported the view (stemming from the work of 
Kahneman and Tversky 1974) that subjects suffer from cognitive limitations on making 
judgements (e.g. with respect to probabilities) on which to base rational choice. They 
therefore resort to reliance on heuristics which introduce biases relative to the predictions 
of standard decision theory. Experiments generally supply subjects with the information 
necessary for making calculations, focusing therefore on information processing errors. 
But, even if they had adequate calculative capabilities, epistemic uncertainty may also 
arise in non-experimental situations if the information that is necessary for making 
probability calculations is inaccessible.3 This inaccessibility may be opportunistically 
wilful (as among borrowers concealing their risk from lenders, or in the opaqueness of 
structured products), the outcome of institutional arrangements (as in the incentives for 
credit-rationing agencies to distort their risk assessment), or it may simply be temporary, 
being resolved as events unfold and new information emerges, or as learning occurs.  
The ambiguity literature, built on Ellsberg’s (1961) experimental work on choice 
where even subjective information on some probabilities is unavailable, similarly 
identifies behaviour which deviates from standard rationality. As with behavioural 
economics, ambiguity theory refers to Knightian uncertainty (see Dequech’s, 2000, 
critique). The driving force is aversion to ambiguity, which poses a challenge to Bayesian 
theory with such results as an absence of trades or an unwillingness to take a position (see 
e.g. Dow and Werlang 1992 and Bewley 2002). Uncertainty about the subjective 
probabilities of Bayesian theory may arise from concealed information, or from 
uncertainty as to the correct model by which to process information (see e.g. Drechsler 
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2013). The psychology literature also suggests that ambiguity may arise with respect to 
the meaning attached to propositions, i.e. ‘semantic’ uncertainty (Lane and Maxfield 
2005). This further source of uncertainty has been a particular focus of monetary 
authorities in their attempts to communicate their expectations and the reasoning behind 
them. Elimination of semantic uncertainty is seen as requiring only increased 
transparency as a mechanism for reducing information asymmetries, thus facilitating 
rational choice (Dow, Klaes and Montagnoli 2007).  
For all these literatures, just as the benchmark for choice is rationality, the 
benchmark for information is full (frequency distribution) information which is, in 
principle at least, knowable, implying a closed-system ontology. Camerer and Weber 
(1992: 330) define ambiguity as ‘uncertainty about probability, created by missing 
information which is relevant and could be known’. True objective probabilities (i.e. true 
measures of risk) and thus true prices therefore exist in principle. The notion of relevance 
is also taken to be objective such that even ‘unknown unknowns’ (unpredicted 
possibilities) would have been revealed by unconstrained information of the deterministic 
processes within a closed-system economy, even if only as disturbances known to be 
stochastic. Uncertainty is treated as a given outcome of an exogenous constraint on full 
information. 
Fundamental uncertainty differs from these mainstream meanings of uncertainty 
in important respects. Of primary importance is the fact that Keynesian uncertainty arises 
from the openness of the economic system and is thus not even in principle eliminable, 
whether or not in crisis situations. If the range of future possibilities cannot be known, it 
is impossible logically to assign even subjective probability estimates which sum to one 
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(even without ambiguity aversion). There is no such thing as ‘true risk’ or a ‘true price’ 
as benchmarks for market fluctuations (Townshend 1937; see further Dow 2013). Second 
uncertainty is not fixed exogenously (or stochastic), but is open to the exercise of 
judgement and some knowledge. The emergence of unknowable unknowns is to be 
expected, and yet some knowledge may be brought to bear (see Runde 2009). Further 
fundamental uncertainty varies in intensity and can be reduced by appropriate change in 
institutions and conventions (or increased by inappropriate change). Similarly the degree 
to which uncertainty is admitted and the attitude to it are not given in Keynesian 
uncertainty theory, but rather can vary as between different groups and also over time. 
Far from being the given consequence of an exogenous constraint on knowledge, as the 
dual of certainty, fundamental uncertainty is endogenous to behaviour and to structure, 
can vary in intensity and is open to degrees of recognition. 
These differences are material to how far uncertainty may be said to have been 
fundamental to the crisis. The incidence of uncertainty (in the sense of unquantifiable 
risk) during the crisis was widely acknowledged, aversion was expressed by financial 
markets and there was widespread incidence of missing markets. Behavioural and 
ambiguity theorists cite evidence of departures from the standard rationality model and 
explain some of the ‘puzzles’ in financial markets (i.e. departures from the standard 
rationality model) by uncertainty and uncertainty aversion. Indeed Boyarchenko (2013) 
derives evidence on changes in uncertainty aversion over time during the crisis. But, 
while some of the verbal analysis in this literature can often be illuminating, it has proved 
difficult to incorporate its insights into formal general equilibrium macroeconomic 
models in order to explain changes in uncertainty and uncertainty aversion.  
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The consequence of retaining the benchmark of fully-informed rational behaviour, e.g. 
on the part of finance specialists, has also limited the scope for explaining the onset of the 
crisis. The ‘uncertainty shock’ literature sees uncertainty being caused by other shocks, 
causing instability and potentially a crisis when amplified by (irrational) herd behaviour. 
But it is the initial shock which is the cause, and uncertainty is gradually dispelled as new 
information emerges. The analysis and policy implications all focus on the factors which 
disturbed equilibrium and impeded market forces from restoring equilibrium, notably 
incomplete information. The expectation then is for successful policy to promote a return 
to normal market conditions, with no expectation of a future crisis unless new forms of 
constraint (especially on information) emerge. More importantly, while these theories 
pick up features of behaviour around the time of crisis, they do not explain the long 
build-up to the crisis through a period of apparent stability (see further Frydman and 
Goldberg 2011, especially ch. 6, for an extended analysis).  
Within a Keynesian framework, pricing in financial markets has no independent 
objective probabilistic basis, given the general absence of quantifiable probabilities. 
Pricing therefore draws on evidence interpreted according to some theory or other, with a 
strong element of conventional judgement which is vulnerable to discrete shifts.  
Minsky’s (1986) Keynesian theory of financial instability sets out the process by which 
conventional expectations become more confidently held during an upswing (although 
the conditions for uncertainty continue to be present), such that planned investment 
increases and finance is more readily available, reinforcing this confidence. The 
multiplier-accelerator effects of this increased investment fuel economic expansion which 
lends further confidence to investment planning and its associated finance. This 
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confidence encourages ever-increasing leverage and therefore ever-increasing fragility of 
the financial structure and also the diversion of activity into speculative markets and 
away from production. It is the fragility rather than the particular event which punctures 
confidence in expectations which brings on the eventual crisis. Indeed it was financial 
stability which bred instability. Increased awareness in retrospect of the flimsy basis for 
the confident expectations of the boom phase increases uncertainty, with the result of 
heightened liquidity preference across all sectors, further fuelling the crisis (Bibow 
2009). The absence of a benchmark of true prices as a guide to behaviour is thus 
fundamental to financial instability. The associated uncertainty is endemic to the market 
process and is thus at the core of the generation of crisis. Those who employed a 
Minskyan analysis therefore anticipated a crisis, although the framework explains why 
the timing and particular character of any crisis are not determinate. 
Keynes’s argument about the generality of uncertainty extended to its domain 
among economists as well as economic agents (Dow 2003). Just as agents face 
fundamental difficulties in forming quantitative probabilistic expectations, so do 
economists face uncertainty in their own forecasting. Keynes showed how uncertainty 
can vary in degree, depending on the relative amount of relevant evidence which can be 
brought to bear on a probabilistic judgement. But relevance in turn depends on a 
theoretical perspective which is itself subject to varying degrees of confidence. Indeed 
the economist’s uncertainty about the validity of models being employed has been the 
subject of the (mainstream) model uncertainty literature (see e.g. Hansen and Sargent 
2001). However model uncertainty is only addressed there in a limited way (Dow 2004). 
Either uncertainty is applied to the choice between a limited range of existing models, or 
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else it is captured in a stochastic error distribution. Being calculative, these analyses of 
uncertainty in fact refer instead to quantifiable risk. Indeed the methodological 
framework within which mainstream economics focuses on calculative rationality 
supports the presumption that there is one best (or even true) model of the economy 
(arrived at through the calculative rationality of economists themselves). It is within this 
context that many economists responded to the crisis initially by opening up to different 
ideas (like a return to a Keynesian theory of aggregate demand), but then retreated into 
variations of pre-crisis thinking. The question was posed in terms of the calculative 
search for a better model, rather than considering whether a single deductivist formal 
model is in fact the best way of formulating economists’ knowledge (Lawson 2009). 
 
Mechanisms for Coping with Uncertainty  
Uncertainty may vary in degree, such that there can be significant periods during which 
uncertainty is relatively low. This could be said of the Great Moderation period which 
pre-dated the crisis, for example. Does this mean that uncertainty is only significant 
temporarily, as a consequence of crisis (even as an exogenous shock)? Was the crisis just 
a Minskyan ‘moment’ (Amariglio and Ruccio 1995; Whalen 2007)? But to regard a crisis 
as a temporary aberration is to reflect the mainstream closed-system approach, whereby 
the norm is gravitation to a stable equilibrium. From this perspective, uncertainty is only 
relevant, if at all, as a temporary exogenous source of anxiety and impediment to markets 
reaching equilibrium. This contrasts with Minsky’s systemic analysis of the macro 
economy over time.  
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But there are further reasons why it is inappropriate to limit considerations of uncertainty 
to times of crisis. Periods of stability in fact owe much to the mechanisms which have 
evolved over time to address uncertainty and which therefore have as much relevance 
during periods of stability as during periods of crisis. In this section we therefore consider 
the range of mechanisms which have evolved in response to uncertainty, changing the 
pre-existing ontology. Rather than considering uncertainty as some kind of periodic 
externally-generated shock or constraint, therefore, we will consider how it has helped to 
shape the institutions, practices and conventions which structure economic life and form 
the basis for future judgements about uncertainty. 
Consideration of mechanisms (both epistemological and institutional) to cope 
with uncertainty goes back at least to Hume and Smith, who both had an ontologically-
founded view of knowledge as being uncertain. Reason and evidence alone were rarely 
sufficient for knowledge, so reliance is placed on conventional understandings or belief, 
built up over long periods of experience. For Hume, the motivation for action, and indeed 
for seeking knowledge, was the passions. Keynes (1937) developed this argument, 
similarly integrating the emotions with cognition (Dow 2011). He identified reliance on 
the views of peers and the views of experts, as well as extrapolating from the past, as a 
way of both underpinning and supplementing reasoned argument drawing on evidence. 
But non-routine action required further the impetus from ‘animal spirits’ (Dow and Dow 
2011).  
New developments in psychology are contributing to our understanding of this 
relation between emotion and cognition. For example, the role of psychology in the study 
of behaviour in financial markets under uncertainty is approached by Tuckett, Chong and 
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Ruatti (2012) from the starting point of Freudian psychoanalysis (see further Tuckett 
2011). Supported by survey evidence from the financial sector, they explain the decision 
to act in spite of uncertainty as being based on judgements about market valuations 
mediated by the motivation to beat the market in some combination with fear of being 
beaten by the market. The justification for action is expressed in the form of a ‘conviction 
narrative’ that presents an argument which is convincing in that it is in itself coherent. 
For Tuckett all knowledge is constructed so that these narratives are all fictional. But 
Keynes had argued that beliefs are formed by applying judgement to a combination of 
sources which include reason and experience. So it is a matter of the nature of the 
sources, the balance of their combination and the judgement applied to develop a 
coherent narrative. We can adapt Tuckett’s ideas by drawing on Lawson’s (1997) 
application of the term ‘fiction’ only to those assumptions that contradict (rather than 
simplify) our understandings of real experience. This useage allows for consideration of 
degrees of fictionality in the sense of how far a narrative contradicts understandings of 
real experience.    
Simon (1955, 1986) had also introduced his notion of bounded rationality, not 
only on cognitive limitations but also on ontological grounds, that it is the open nature of 
social systems which limits the availability of information: ‘the characteristics of the 
environment [of choice] and the interrelations of environment and organism [of choice]’ 
(Simon 1955: 100). As Loasby (1989: 141) puts it, ‘That the complexity of our 
environment, natural and artificial, extends far beyond the bounds of our rationality is the 
central fact with which Simon has been trying to deal throughout his career’. Simon 
therefore considered cognitive and informational limitations in a broader sense than 
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Kahneman and Tversky’s subsequent analysis. By identifying limitations on ontological 
grounds, he challenged the scope for calculative rationality itself. Simon pioneered the 
concept of heuristics (mental short-cuts) as an alternative to calculative rationality, 
providing a basis for behaviour under uncertainty, where rationality is bounded.4 Indeed, 
starting from evidence of the nature of actual decision-making rather than the benchmark 
of constrained optimisation, Simon saw heuristics in a positive light (not a constraint), as 
enabling decision-making under uncertainty, rather than a source of rigidity in 
mainstream choice theory (Earl 2012). This emphasis on the important positive role of 
heuristics has been developed further by Gigerenzer (see e.g. Gigerenzer 2007).5  
Both Hume and Smith also discussed the role of legal structures (particularly 
those surrounding property rights and contracts) as a way of organising society which 
reduced uncertainty. Their work was a strong influence on Hayek (1960, 1973-9), for 
whom social order arose, not through deliberate action, but through the unintended 
consequences of habitual action on the part of individuals, including the endogenous 
emergence of institutions. Again, what appears in choice theory as a rigidity is in this 
view something which serves to reduce uncertainty and thus encourage action. The 
emergence of institutions more generally can be understood as a means of reducing 
uncertainty (see further Hodgson 1988). The existence of the firm itself (indeed of any 
contractual arrangement) can be understood as a mechanism to reduce uncertainty for 
some parties involved, providing a pool of liquidity and a basis for action (Loasby 2011). 
As Coase (1937: 22) put it ‘It seems improbable that a firm would emerge without the 
existence of uncertainty’. Within the firm, further, particular strategies are developed to 
aid decision-making under uncertainty; scenario planning, for example, is a methodology 
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which has proved to be very helpful in practice for forming judgments within the firm in 
the face of uncertainty (Jefferson 2012).  
More widely market relations depend on the support of the state and the gradual 
build-up of non-calculative trust (uncertainty precluding calculation). The banking 
system in particular operates on trust, allowing a fractional reserve system which 
produces money, which underpins all other market institutions (Davidson 1972). Keynes 
discussed liquidity preference in terms of the demand to hold money because it is the 
safest asset to hold when uncertainty is high. But the institutional structure which 
produces money has evolved over time, with money assets having varying capability to 
address uncertainty. As we saw in the crisis, some features of this evolution undermined 
confidence in money assets. Sometimes the policy changes introduced to reduce the 
incidence of crisis in the future may have the reverse effect. For example the introduction 
of capital adequacy requirements in the 1980s encouraged the securitisation and 
derivatives activities which fuelled the current crisis (Chick 2013). Among financial 
institutions themselves financial products such as derivatives and credit default swaps 
were developed to reduce uncertainty, although in aggregate the effect turned out to be 
the increase in uncertainty on the onset of crisis. 
Given that so much of the structure within which markets operate, therefore, is the 
product of long experience of uncertainty, uncertainty is a factor to take into account as a 
long-term phenomenon in addition to its short-term variations. But periods of crisis and 
thus of increased uncertainty can often prompt structural shifts. These developments may 
be designed to reduce the chances of a recurrence of crisis and thus high levels of 
uncertainty, such as changes in relations between banks and the central bank following a 
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banking crisis. There is a ratchet effect, such that these institutional arrangements 
continue beyond the crisis and condition the experience in the build-up to the next crisis. 
This was the thinking behind Keynes’s approach to monetary policy, which was to 
prioritise the promotion of financial stability (Tily 2007). But sometimes crisis situations 
can disrupt longstanding conventions and institutions, as when confidence is destroyed or 
large institutions fail.  
Tuckett, Chong and Ruatti (2012) explain the scope for profit-seeking behaviour 
in financial markets as arising from the same conditions that generate uncertainty. But the 
financial crisis arguably stemmed from mechanisms which fostered over-confidence in 
expectations as to risk and return, that is, an inappropriate inattention to uncertainty. 
Tuckett (2011) explains this phenomenon in terms of Freudian psychoanalysis applied to 
the emotional aspects of financial behaviour: ‘as human beings we deal with such 
conflicting feelings by making the painful ones unconscious; we behave as though we 
never thought or felt whatever it is we don’t like’ (Tafler and Tuckett 2007: 19). Tuckett 
explains excessive upswings in asset values in terms of pursuit of the ‘phantastic object’, 
suppressing reason grounded in evidence. The resulting theory of emotional finance has 
provided an interpretation of survey evidence of the emotional withdrawal from 
uncertainty into fear (see also Gordon 2003: 111). The conviction narratives which 
Tuckett, Chong and Ruatti (2012) identify as being necessary to enable action under 
uncertainty inevitably require more than reason and evidence (just as Hume had argued). 
But these narratives can deviate unduly from reason and evidence when focused on a 
‘phantastic object’. In terms of our discussion above, the degree of fictionality in the 
narratives used to justify action increases. Such narratives in turn may be the source, 
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further, of semantic uncertainty when they provide accounts which conflict with other 
accounts, particularly reality-based accounts. But there may be a strong motivation to 
avoid such uncertainty. Cognitive dissonance arising from conflicting constructions put 
on experience is uncomfortable, encouraging the reaction of denial (Earl 1992). 
A powerful conflict of narratives is provided by the fact that financial markets 
have relied increasingly on quantitative models which exclude uncertainty, limiting scope 
for judgement, while the experience of uncertainty became palpable in the crisis. We 
know that individual traders are aware of some of the limitations of quantitative models 
(McKenzie 2006, Tuckett 2011). But this awareness extended only to the scope for ‘mis-
pricing’ relative to a correct price, and thus the scope for trading opportunities. Strategy 
in the financial sector in the run-up to the crisis arguably was shaped by institutional 
narratives that were unduly influenced by the excessive confidence which arose from a 
basic modelling approach which ignored uncertainty. Indeed this modelling approach was 
institutionalised by the very capital adequacy requirements which were intended to 
reduce risk. The mechanism which therefore evolved in financial markets to address 
uncertainty in the run-up to the crisis was denial.  
Uncertainty-denial may be enabling in some contexts, e.g. when it comes to 
entrepreneurial action. Indeed Keynes (1936: ch. 11, 12) pointed out that a rational (in the 
mainstream economics sense) investor would never have sufficient basis for action. But 
suppressing awareness of uncertainty can be counterproductive when it encourages 
suppression of reason and evidence. The institutional arrangements which had evolved 
over a long period to address uncertainty had steadily been dismantled since the 1970s 
(Chick 2008 and 2013), leaving markets vulnerable to the onset of crisis which, rather 
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than a random shock, was the systematic outcome of behaviour governed by denial of 
uncertainty. This proved not to be a successful coping mechanism since the outcome was 
a debilitating level of uncertainty. 
Economists, like every other group, are exposed to uncertainty and have forged 
their own ways of coping with it. If indeed the subject matter is open and evolving, then, 
as Hume, Smith and Keynes had argued, our knowledge about it is in general uncertain. 
Indeed Smith (1795) argued that it was uncertainty prompted by novel events (what he 
called ‘wonder’) which motivated scientific enquiry; this was a psychological drive to set 
the mind at rest by finding patterns, through making new connections, which made sense 
of new phenomena. While it was recognised that knowledge was uncertain, uncertainty 
was ignored in the sense that scientific enquiry proceeded anyway, but was 
acknowledged in the recognition that theories could not be demonstrated as true.6 The 
study of economics can be understood therefore as an attempt to reduce our uncertainty 
about the economy.  
Faced with uncertainty, economists have developed conventions as to how best to 
reduce it, but, as with the economy, these conventions can be more or less successful. 
The dominant convention, which has gained force over the last fifty years, is to build 
theory within a formal deductivist framework. The resulting models are based on axioms 
about optimising behaviour on the part of individual agents, where (frequency-
distribution-based) information is held with certainty (or certainty equivalence). The 
recent literature has introduced modifications with respect to knowledge being concealed 
(asymmetric information), aversion to such concealment, and cognitive capacities being 
limited. Chick (1995) has analysed this closed-system approach in terms of its dualism, 
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drawing on Prigogine’s critique of traditional science. Science had been understood as a 
means of identifying the order underlying apparent chaos. This ‘mechanistic, linear 
approach that has pervaded the course of science over the past 350 years has led to the 
glorification of order and the subsequent objectification of reality. At the same time, the 
idea of mystery—a sense of the unknowable—has typically been dismissed by science as 
mere metaphysics or, worse, superstitious ignorance—the last refuge of a primitive mind’ 
(Gordon 2003: 100).  
To think, as we have done here, of economic methodology in terms of 
conventions for coping with uncertainty is to reflect the conclusions from the philosophy 
of science that there is no demonstrably best methodology of science. Rather, 
communities of scientists develop methodologies which make most sense to them in 
relation to the way in which they understand the subject matter (their ontology), 
perpetuate it through ‘normal science’ and propagate it through education. Non-
mainstream approaches to economics, which have different ontologies, have therefore 
developed different conventions from mainstream economics. Post Keynesians for 
example have put uncertainty at the core of their theory, seeing it as an essential feature 
of the economic process. As a result, just as economic agents employ a range of methods 
to build up expectations in which they can have confidence, so Post Keynesian 
economists employ a range of methods and styles of argument, that is, a pluralist 
methodology. 
To the extent that most economists treat uncertainty, if at all, as peripheral, they 
too have been engaging in denial, suppressing cognitive dissonance. As Gordon (2003: 
15) states with respect to the unknowable: ‘[f]or the positivist, there is only denial’. This 
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can be seen as a coping mechanism, but also follows from the dualistic methodological 
approach which is based on understanding the economy as a closed system buffeted by 
random shocks and subjected to constraints (especially on information). Because 
apparently this basic understanding has not fundamentally changed, the uncertainty 
evident among mainstream economists at the onset of crisis seems to have been dispelled 
and confidence in theorising restored. But, while denial of uncertainty reduced the 
uncertainty of most mainstream economists, it has had widespread consequences for the 
economy. Economists have presented themselves as experts, whose judgements serve to 
reduce uncertainty among economic agents and policy-makers. Yet in the crisis 
economists were widely criticised for their failure to predict and then, in the immediate 
aftermath, explain the crisis. Mainstream economists had compounded the problem of 
denying uncertainty in their theories by failing to acknowledge the uncertainty attached to 
their own expertise. There is a conflict between the way in which mainstream economists 
present themselves and how they are often regarded in society (see further Hayek 1974).  
Policy-makers, even when following a course set by mainstream theory, are in a 
special position. Because they are required to engage with an economy which is 
conditioned by uncertainty, they have to face up also to their own uncertainty. Indeed 
speeches by members of the UK’s Monetary Policy Committee have frequently referred 
to uncertainty (see for example King 2010) and the lead for much of the discussion of 
economists’ model uncertainty came from central banks. But, since the theoretical 
guidance is generally taken from the mainstream, the view taken of uncertainty is in 
practice very limited. Thus the efforts to promote transparency with respect to central 
bank thinking presumes that full information is in principle available, while the central 
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bank view of risks with respect to forecasts is quantified, e.g. by fan charts. More 
fundamentally mainstream theory encouraged inattention to the way in which institutions 
and conventions had previously evolved to promote confidence in money, and financial 
stability more generally, thus reducing uncertainty. The initial policy response to the 
crisis presumed a prevalence of calculative rationality with respect to benchmark 
equilibrium prices rather than the growing awareness of the flimsy basis for market 
pricing and the prevalence of uncertainty which was undermining trust.  
 
Concluding Remarks: A Non-dualistic Approach to Uncertainty 
Within mainstream economics it is generally implied that uncertainty is by its nature 
uncomfortable and unwelcome, challenging our liking for order. Choice theory allows for 
ambiguity aversion as well as risk aversion as a given preference. Indeed we have 
discussed the response to the experience of uncertainty so far in terms of reducing its 
damaging effects. This negative view of uncertainty is also evident in the non-
mainstream literature that studies the evolution of behaviour and institutions in terms of 
uncertainty as a central feature of the economic process.  
Within a closed-system approach, the mode of thought is dualistic, such that 
certain knowledge is juxtaposed to its opposite, ignorance/uncertainty. While the new 
behavioural economics is uncovering evidence of heuristics and biases relative to the 
rationality benchmark, the challenge ultimately has been to translate these results into the 
formal deductivist framework (Dow 2012). Uncertainty represents a lack (of certainty or 
certainty-equivalence) which prevents agents from fully-informed rational optimisation, 
so that it is seen as anathema (particularly in financial markets). It acts as an impediment 
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to the optimal operation of free markets, in much the same way as the exercise of 
emotion (equated with irrationality and typically viewed as another exogenous 
disturbance), and thus reduces social welfare. 
The Keynesian view of fundamental uncertainty explained above avoids this 
dualism. Fundamental uncertainty is endogenous in the long and short terms and is open 
to analysis. Where an absence of quantitative probabilities is the general case, knowledge 
is subject to uncertainty of varying degrees and relies substantially on judgment. 
Uncertainty is open to change as a result of institutional change and the emergence of 
new conventional understandings, including the attitude to uncertainty. The degree to 
which uncertainty is admitted may change with circumstances. 
But how far is the consistent aversion to fundamental uncertainty displayed in 
mainstream economics7 justified on Keynesian grounds? Uncertainty aversion finds some 
support in the psychology literature where it is often equated with anxiety (Smithson 
2008), as well as being identified with quantifiable risk.8 But psychology, like economics, 
is characterised by different schools of thought, such that this is not a universal view of 
uncertainty in the field. Indeed there is also a view in psychology that uncertainty should 
not be understood in dualistic terms, but rather as the outcome of creativity, with both 
positive and negative features. The psychologist Gordon (2003: 96) for example 
challenges the traditional scientific approach to uncertainty, referring to: ‘Prigogine’s 
assertion that uncertainty is an inherent cosmic expression, deeply embedded within the 
core of reality. The deep psychic expression of this experience is anxiety which … is 
conceived not as pathology but rather as an essential state of being emerging 
simultaneously with uncertainty’.  
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Gordon explicitly contrasts his view of uncertainty with that which arises from a 
formal deductivist framework. Creativity is an innate aspect of human nature which is 
generally regarded in a positive light. It generates a form of uncertainty which is exciting 
and gives meaning to life. Similarly economists such as Hayek, Knight and Shackle have 
focused on creativity as central to entrepreneurial activity and in turn to economic growth 
(Loasby 2011). Competitors are not content with normal profits but continuously seek 
abnormal profits by creative differentiation from others. This creativity is associated with 
the pre-conditions for uncertainty, which can be energising rather than debilitating.  
While these are the pre-conditions also for entrepreneurship, the entrepreneur is 
characterised as someone who acts in spite of uncertainty. This is a form of uncertainty-
denial which occurs within the open-system understanding of reality within which new 
opportunities are created and without which no non-routine action would be taken. 
Similarly semantic uncertainty can act as a spur to new understandings which facilitate 
innovation (Lane and Maxfield 2005). For economists themselves, uncertainty can act as 
a spur to innovative theoretical developments. When Smith (1795) wrote of the sense of 
wonder at novel events as a motivation for science, he did not talk about anxiety or 
cognitive dissonance in negative terms, which is what uncertainty can promote in a 
pessimistic environment, but more of the excitement of uncertainty in an optimistic 
environment.  
Within such an open-system framework, uncertainty is shown to be embedded in 
the decision-making environment. For economists to understand that environment, they 
need to understand uncertainty. Ignoring uncertainty (including uncertainty denial in the 
economy) protects the economist from anxiety, but at the cost of failing to understand 
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something fundamental to the economy. By embracing the presence of uncertainty, 
therefore, non-mainstream economists are able to build up knowledge which is precluded 
from mainstream economics. As a result, by understanding uncertainty, non-mainstream 
economists are in a better position to address in particular the contexts in which 
uncertainty may have damaging consequences and develop theories and policy 
prescriptions designed to reduce it.  
But a changed understanding of uncertainty also requires a changed way of 
thinking in much of economics. The closed-system approach requires resistance to 
incorporating uncertainty, while uncertainty-denial reinforces the preference for closed-
system thinking. Change would be required at the conceptual level, allowing for the 
positive aspects of uncertainty for example, as well as the implications of uncertainty for 
the scope for knowledge. It would also require a move from the monism of mathematical 
formalism to one of the many possible pluralist methodologies, where a range of methods 
is employed in order to build up a considered view with the aid of judgement. The 
outcome would allow for a greater focus on the factors which are central to economic 
behaviour under uncertainty and thus a greater capacity to address any resulting 
problems, as well as opportunities. A case in point is the current crisis which could not 
readily be understood or analysed with existing mainstream theories but which made 
perfect sense from a Keynes/Minsky perspective which has uncertainty at its core. 
The financial crisis arguably stemmed from mechanisms which fostered over-
confidence in expectations as to risk and return, that is, inattention to uncertainty. It was 
argued that the uncertainty-denial adopted by financial markets and by mainstream 
economists has ultimately been counterproductive, actually increasing uncertainty. 
 24 
Further, within a closed-system approach, fundamental uncertainty can only enter as an 
exogenous distortion, seen in negative terms. But, while uncertainty can at times be 
debilitating, it can be seen at other times as being the counterpart to creativity and 
emergence. It is concluded that, rather than recoiling from uncertainty to the extent of not 
addressing it seriously, economists would do better by accepting its significance and 
developing methodologies and theories accordingly. The resulting improved 
understanding of economic processes would in fact serve to reduce the damaging aspects 
of economists’ uncertainty and, potentially, of uncertainty in the economy.  
 
References 
Akerlof, G A (2002) ‘Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior’, 
American Economic Review 92 (3): 411-33. 
Amargilio, J and Ruccio, D F (1995) ‘Keynes, Postmodernism and Uncertainty’, in S. C. 
Dow and J. Hillard (eds), Keynes, Knowledge and Uncertainty. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.  
Bewley, T (2002) ‘Knightian Decision- Theory: Part I’, Cowles Foundation Paper No. 
1053. 
Bibow, J (2009) Keynes on Monetary Policy, Finance and Uncertainty: Liquidity 
Preference Theory and the Global Financial Crisis, London: Routledge. 
Bloom, N (2009) ‘The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks’, Econometrica, 77 (3): 623-85. 
 25 
Boyarchenko, N (2102) ‘Ambiguity Shifts and the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis’, Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 59: 493-507. 
Camerer, C and Weber, M (1992) ‘Recent Developments in Modelling Preferences: 
Uncertainty and Ambiguity’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5: 325-70. 
Chick, V (1995) ‘”Order out of Chaos” in Economics?’, in S C Dow and J Hillard (eds), 
Keynes, Knowledge and Uncertainty. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 25-42. 
Chick, V (2008) ‘Could the crisis at Northern Rock have been predicted?: An 
evolutionary approach’, Contributions to Political Economy 27: 115-24. 
Chick, V (2013) ‘The current banking crisis: an evolutionary view’, in G C Harcourt and 
J Pixley (eds), Financial crises and the nature of capitalist money: Mutual developments 
from the work of Geoffrey Ingham. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Chick, V and Dow, S C ([2005] 2012) ‘The Meaning of Open Systems’, Journal of 
Economic Methodology, 12: 363-81, reprinted in S C Dow, Foundations for New 
Economic Thinking: a collection of essays. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.178-96. 
Coase, R H ([1937] 1991) ‘The Nature of the Firm’, reprinted in O E Williamson and S G 
Winter, eds, The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 18-33. 
Davidson, P (1972) Money and the Real World. London: Macmillan. 
 26 
Dequech, D (2000) Fundamental uncertainty and Ambiguity’, Eastern Economic Journal 26 
(1): 41-60. 
Dow, A C and Dow, S C (2011) ‘Animal Spirits Revisited’, Capitalism and Society 6(2) 
article 1, at http://www.bepress.com/cas/vol6/iss2/art1/.  
Dow, J and Werlang, S R da C (1992) ‘Uncertainty Aversion, Risk Aversion, and the 
Optimal Choice of Portfolio’, Econometrica 60 (1): 197-204. 
Dow, S C ([1995] 2012) ‘Uncertainty about Uncertainty’, in S C Dow and J Hillard (eds), 
Keynes, Knowledge and Uncertainty. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 117-27, reprinted in S C 
Dow, Foundations for New Economic Thinking: a collection of essays. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 72-82. 
Dow, S C (2003) ‘Economists’ Knowledge and the Knowledge of Economic Actors’, in J 
Runde and S Mizuhara (eds), Perspectives on the Philosophy of Keynes’s Economics: 
Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. London: Routledge. 
Dow, S C (2004) ‘Uncertainty and Monetary Policy’, Oxford Economic Papers, 56: 539-
61.  
Dow, S C (2011) ‘Cognition, Sentiment and Financial Instability: Psychology in a 
Minsky Framework’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 35(2): 233-50. 
Dow, S C (2012) ‘Mark Blaug on Formalism and Reality: the case of behavioural 
economics’, University of Stirling mimeo. 
 27 
Dow, S C (2013) ‘Keynes on Knowledge, Expectations and Rationality’, forthcoming in 
E S Phelps and R Frydman (eds), Rethinking Expectations: the Way Forward for 
Macroeconomics. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Dow, S C, Klaes, M and Montagnoli, A (2007) ‘Monetary Policy by Signal’, in D G 
Mayes and J Toporowski (eds), Open Market Operations and the Financial Markets. 
London: Routledge. 
Drechsler, I (2013) ‘Uncertainty, Time-Varying Fear, and Asset Prices’, Journal of 
Finance 68 (5): 1843-89. Not in text; model U in asset pmarkets, eqm anal 
Earl, P E (1984) The Corporate Imagination: How Big Companies Make Mistakes. 
Brighton: Wheatsheaf. 
Earl, P E ([1992] 2010) ‘The Complementarity of Economic Applications of Cognitive 
Dissonance Theory and Personal Construct Psychology’, in S E G Lea, P Webley and B 
M Young (eds), New Directions in Economic Psychology. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Updated version accessible at http://shredecon.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/cep-
dissonance.pdf 
Earl, P E (2012) ‘Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow from the Standpoint of Old 
Behavioural Economics’, presented to the annual HETSA Conference, 
http://www.hetsa.org.au/hetsa2012/abstracts_index.html 
Ellsberg, D (1961) ‘Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms’.  Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 65: 743-9. 
 28 
Feduzi, A, Runde, J and Zappia, C (2012) ‘De Finetti on the insurance of risks 
and uncertainties’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 63(2): 329-56. 
Frydman, R and Goldberg, M (2011) Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings, 
Risk and the Role of the State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Gigerenzer, G (2007) Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious. New York: 
Viking Press. 
Gordon, K (2003)   ‘The Impermanence of Being: Toward a Psychology of Uncertainty’, 
Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 43 (2): 96-117. 
Hansen, L P and Sargent, T J (2001). ‘Acknowledging misspecification in 
macroeconomic theory’, Review of Economic Dynamics 4: 519-35. 
Hayek F A (1960) The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Hayek F A (1973-9) Law, Legislation and Liberty, 3 vols. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
Hayek, F A (1974) ‘The Pretence of Knowledge’, Nobel Prize Lecture, accessible at 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1974/hayek-lecture.html 
Hodgson, G M (1988) Economics and Institutions. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Jefferson, M (2012) ‘Shell scenarios: What really happened in the 1970s and what may 
be learned for current world prospects’, Technological Forecasting & Social Change 79: 
186–97. 
 29 
Kahneman, D and Tversky, A (1974) ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases’, Science 185: 1124-31. 
Keynes, J M ([1921] 1973) A Treatise on Probability, Collected Writings vol. VIII. 
London: Macmillan, for the Royal Economic Society 
Keynes, J M ([1926] 1972) ‘The End to Laissez-faire’, in Essays in Persuasion. Collected 
Writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol. IX. London: Macmillan, pp. 270-94. 
Keynes, J M ([1936] 1973) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 
Collected Writings volume VII. London: Macmillan, for the Royal Economic Society. 
Keynes, J M ([1937] 1973) ‘The General Theory of Employment’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 51, 209-23, reprinted in The General Theory and After, Part II: Defence and 
Development, Collected Writings, vol. XIV. London: Macmillan for the Royal Economic 
Society. 
King, M (2010) ‘Uncertainty in Macroeconomic Policy Making: Art or Science?’, speech 
delivered to the Royal Society Conference, London, 22 March. 
Knight, F H (1921) Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Boston, MA: Hart, Schaffner & Marx; 
Houghton Mifflin & Co. 
Lane, D and Maxfield, R (2005) ‘Ontological Uncertainty and Innovation’, Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, 15: 3-50. 
 30 
Lawson, T (1988) ‘Probability and uncertainty in economics analysis’, Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics, 11 (1): 38-65. 
Lawson, T (1997) Economics and Reality. London: Routledge. 
Lawson, T (2009) ‘The current economic crisis: its nature and the course of academic 
economics’, Cambridge Journal of Econonomics, 33(4): 759-77. 
Loasby, B J (2011) ‘Uncertainty and imagination, illusion and order: Shackleian 
connections’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 35 (4): 771–83. 
MacKenzie, D (2006) ‘Is Economics Performative? Option Theory and the Construction 
of Derivatives Markets’, Journal of the History of Economic Thought 28(1): 29-55. 
Minsky, H P (1986) Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Runde, J (1995) ‘Risk, uncertainty and Bayesian decision theory: a Keynesian view’, in S 
C Dow and J Hillard (eds), Keynes, Knowledge and Uncertainty. Aldershot: Edward 
Elgar, 197-210. 
Runde, J (1990) ‘Keynesian uncertainty and the weight of arguments’, Economics and 
Philosophy 6: 275-92. 
Runde, J (2009) ‘Dissecting the Black Swan’, Critical Review 21(4): 491-505. 
Shackle, G L S (1968) A Scheme of Economic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. Not in text 
 31 
Simon, H (1955) ‘A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice’ Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 69 (1): 99-118. 
Simon, H (1986) ‘Rationality and Psychology in Economics’, Journal of Business 59 
(4:2): 5209-24. 
Skidelsky, R (2009) Keynes: The Return of the Master by Robert Skidelsky 
Allen Lane. Not in text 
Skidelsky, R (2011) ‘The relevance of Keynes’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 35 
(1): 1-13. Not in text 
Smith, A ([1795] 1980) ‘The History of Astronomy’, in Essays on Philosophical 
Subjects, edited by W L D Wightman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 33-105. 
Smithson, M (2008) ‘Psychology’s ambivalent view of uncertainty’, in G Bammer  and 
M Smithson, eds, Uncertainty and Risk: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. London: 
Earthscan, pp. 205-218. 
Stiglitz, J (2010) ‘The Non-existent Hand’, London Review of Books, 32 (8), 22 April.  
Taffler, R and Tuckett, D (2007) ‘Emotional Finance: Understanding what Drives 
Investors’, Professional Investor, Autumn: 19-20. 
Tily, G (2007) Keynes’s General; Theory, the Rate of Interest and ‘Keynesian’ 
Economics: Keynes Betrayed. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 32 
Townshend, H (1937) ‘Liquidity-premium and the theory of value’, Economic Journal 47 
(March): 157–69. 
Tuckett, D (2011) Minding the Markets: an emotional finance view of financial 
instability. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Tuckett, D, Chong, K and Ruatti, C (2012) ‘Re-thinking Uncertainty’, University College 
London mimeo.  
Weber, E U and Johnson, E J (2008) ‘Decisions under uncertainty: Psychological, 
economic, and neuroeconomic explanations of risk preference’, in P Glimcher, C 
Camerer, E Fehr and R Poldrack, eds, Neuroeconomics: Decision making and the brain. 
New York: Elsevier. 
Whalen, C J (2007) ‘The U.S. Credit Crunch of 2007: A Minsky Moment’, Levy Institute 
Public Policy Brief no. 92. 
 
                                                 
1 See Lawson (1988) for a careful exploration of epistemic and aleatory uncertainty in 
economics. 
2 See Chick and Dow (2005) for a full specification of the conditions for closure. 
3 This possibility of asymmetric information underpinned Akerlof’s (2002) introduction 
to behavioural macroeconomics. 
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4 These bounds might apply to the taking in of evidence; Shackle (1968: 67) introduced 
the notion of expectational time as a mechanism for abstracting from the passage of real 
time, thus reducing uncertainty.  
5 A similar argument could be developed with respect to anxiety, as an enabling emotion. 
6 The contrast being drawn here between regarding uncertainty as a normal condition of 
knowledge on the one hand and as ignorance on the other parallels Kant’s 
misunderstanding of Hume’s skepticism as being destructive of science. 
7 We have seen that there is less aversion now to addressing the more limited sense of 
uncertainty which results from asymmetric information. 
8 In the interface between psychology and economics, it is common to find the equation 
of uncertainty with quantifiable risk (Weber and Johnson 2008). 
